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This paper examines the effect of job mobility on the Black-White wage gap over the
early career through the theoretical channels of job shopping motives, human capital
accumulation, and statistical discrimination in the labor market. Using data from
the National Survey of Youth 1979 spanning the years of 1979 to 2002, I estimate
the differential returns to job mobility over the worker life-cycle using Armed Forces
Qualifications Test (AFQT) score and tenure as proxies for general unobserved skill
and job-specific human capital, respectively. I find that controlling for job mobility
over time explains the observed Black-White wage gap over the worker life-cycle since
Black workers face a large penalty when they change employers. Furthermore, the
analysis shows that Black workers face a greater extent of wage loss at higher levels
of pre-separation tenure. The empirical results indicate that the observed Black-White
wage can be explained with the theoretical channels of statistical discrimination or
human capital accumulation. The findings in this paper provide additional directions
for future research to investigate how the three theoretical channels can explain the
development of the Black-White wage gap through job mobility.
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1 Introduction
For more than half of the past century, Black-White wage differentials have persisted re-
lentlessly in the labor market despite the considerable gains in economic outcomes made
by Black workers. In 2019, Black men earned about 71% of the weekly earnings of White
men without controlling for observed factors related to disparities in earnings such as edu-
cation, age, and industry (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). While these observed factors
account for most of the racial wage gap, unobserved factors have increasingly accounted
for the unexplained portion of the Black-White wage gap over the past few decades (Daly,
Hobijn, & Pedtke, 2017). After accounting for observed characteristics, about a third of the
earnings gap for Black and White workers was left unexplained in 1979. And by 2016, this
unexplained portion had increased to account for nearly half of the total Black-White wage
gap.
Though Black-White wage differentials are typically explained by pre-market factors,
the unexplained portion can be disentangled with different economic theories relating to
observed events and decisions that occur after individuals enter the labor market. Research
on workers’ post-market entry decisions on lifetime earnings include topics on job mobility.
Notably, the increase in earnings associated with job mobility accounts for at least a third of
wage growth in the early career, and job mobility is critical for workers’ stable employment
later in their careers (Topel & Ward, 1992). Given its large influence on workers’ earnings,
the effect of job mobility should be examined when studying the Black-White wage gap. In
this paper, I investigate how job mobility affects the observed Black-White wage gap over the
worker life-cycle through three theoretical channels: the job shopping channel, the human
capital channel, and the statistical discrimination channel.
First, the job shopping channel refers to workers’ decisions behind moving jobs and how
the effect of changes in certain firm or geographic characteristics differentially affect Black
and White workers’ earnings. Since workers move for different reasons, a job transition
can be accompanied by a change of a firm characteristic or geographic location. If wage
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bargaining is more frequent in large firms, Black workers who move to a larger firm may lead
to observed wage differentials if Black workers have less wage-setting power relative to White
workers. Second, the human capital channel refers to differences in Black and White workers’
job-specific skills accumulated over their time in the labor market and how job transitions
interrupt the accumulation process. Through this channel, Black workers are expected to
face a greater wage loss relative to White workers when they have the same levels of pre-
separation tenure. Lastly, the statistical discrimination channel discerns the mechanisms by
which employers pay their workers according to the level of workers’ observed productivity.
When there is statistical discrimination, employers that negatively associate productivity
with race will initially pay a Black worker less than a White worker of the same level of
unobserved skill. Over time, the employer learns about the Black worker’s true ability and
compensates him for his marginal product. When Black workers change jobs, the employer
learning process is reset with his new employer and thus he faces another wage penalty
in his new job. The existence of statistical discrimination and job transitions would lead
to an observed Black-White wage gap over the early career. Given that general and job-
specific human capital accumulation significantly increases wage growth in the early career,
the different effects on wages for Black and White workers are ambiguous when considering
these theoretical channels. A Black worker makes less in earnings relative to a White worker
that has the same level of unobserved skills and the difference in wages is exacerbated when
Black workers move jobs.
To investigate whether the three aforementioned theories can explain the Black-White
wage gap, I use individual-level panel data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth
1979 (NLSY) over the years of 1979-2002 with a sample of Black and White men that have
either received a high school diploma or college degree. I present an ordinary least squares
model to examine the returns to job mobility by race. In the model, I utilize the measure of
potential experience to estimate wage trends over time. To estimate these effects over the
early career, I include a linear combination of interactions between potential experience, a
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Black indicator variable, and a job-moving dummy to estimate the returns to mobility by
race over time. Similarly, I add interactions with tenure to estimate the effect of job-specific
human capital and job moving on the wage gap. Additionally, I analyze whether statistical
discrimination and employer learning have a role in the Black-White wage gap through
the use of workers’ Armed Qualifications Test (AFQT) scores as a proxy for unobserved
productivity. Finally, I classify observed changes in firm size and occupation as career-
related reasons and geographic changes as non-wage reasons for changing jobs to estimate
the effect of Black and White workers’ job shopping motives on wages.
Among high school-educated workers, I find that Black workers who change jobs reap
significantly fewer returns to experience in the early career relative to White workers of the
same level of unobserved skills. Black workers who make a job transition earn roughly 1.5 less
than White workers’ returns to job mobility for each additional year in the labor market.
Furthermore, the results also show that Black workers have a greater extent of wage loss
upon changing jobs when they have higher levels of pre-separation tenure. The empirical
evidence suggests that the observed Black-White wage differentials can be explained by the
existence of statistical discrimination in the labor market or differences in the accumulation
of job-specific skills and human capital.
This paper supplements the existing literature on the Black-White wage gap by introduc-
ing theory on employer learning, human capital accumulation, and job shopping to explain
the observed wage differentials over the early career. The results of this paper can advise
policy changes to increase equitable outcomes in the labor market. Since productivity differ-
ences in Black and White workers continue to drive part of the wage gap, policy changes in
the pre-market period include increasing job-specific skills training before the completion of
formal education. Additionally, policy regarding anti-discrimination enforcement in hiring
and pay is needed so that Black workers are compensated for their skills.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on job mo-
bility. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework on the mechanisms through which job
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mobility affects the Black-White wage gap. Section 4 describes the data used for analysis,
sample selection, and variable creation. Section 5 presents the empirical model that esti-
mates the returns to job mobility by race. Section 6 discusses the empirical results. Section
7 concludes with policy implications and areas for further research.
2 Literature Review
The large body of theoretical and empirical literature on Black-White disparities in labor
market outcomes focuses on pre-market factors, such as primary education and family back-
ground (Black et al., 2006; Neal & Johnson, 1996). Though these studies have shown that
pre-market factors have a large role on wage differentials by race, research to explain this
gap with the post-market entry experiences of Black and White workers has been relatively
sparse. Within this area of literature, researchers have explored Black-White worker dif-
ferences in the topics of match theory and occupational matching (Golan & Sanders, 2019;
Neal, 1999) and geographic mobility (Raphael & Riker, 1999). Since job mobility is linked
to the theory of job matching (Jovanovic, 1979), the effect of job mobility on the wages of
young workers has been studied extensively but has less frequently focused on effects by race.
I contribute to the literature by departing from these models and differentiating the effect
of mobility by race and education.
In general, the returns to job mobility are defined as the difference in wages between
two successive jobs of employed workers. Many studies have shown that average rates of job
changing decline with age or experience and decline even more with current job tenure (Min-
cer, 1986; Topel & Ward, 1992). Especially in the early career, human capital accumulation
is a strong determinant in how much a worker gains in his returns to mobility. The study
from Topel & Ward concludes that a worker’s uncertainty about the match with his job
declines as he learns of certain information about a career match and as he accumulates job-
specific human capital over his actual labor market experience and tenure. When examining
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the gendered differences of job mobility and career interruptions, Amano-Patiño, Baron, and
Xiao (2020) find that fertility-related interruptions on the wage gap result in women having
lower levels of human capital. Overall, many studies on job mobility suggest that workers
learn about their specific skills as they complement their respective productivity in certain
jobs (Jovanovic, 1979; Neal, 1999). That said, papers on the effect of human capital accu-
mulation on workers’ mobility decisions primarily use samples of White men or women and
do not consider the heterogeneous characteristics of workers, particularly of race, that may
contribute to the observed differences in earnings. In this paper, I extend my analysis on
the role of human capital accumulation in job transitions with a focus on racial differences.
In empirical papers that study skill matching through job transitions, authors typically
utilize measures of schooling as a proxy for workers’ general human capital. Especially on pa-
pers that investigate the Black-White wage gap, authors have departed from using schooling
or academic achievement as a measure of ability and instead employ workers’ Armed Forces
Qualifications Test (AFQT) score in wage regressions. Neal and Johnson (1996) argue that
years of schooling likely overstate the relative skill of Black workers since schooling is char-
acterized as an input rather than an outcome of workers’ abilities. While Neal and Johnson
rely on AFQT as a proxy for skills, studies have shown that schooling itself affects AFQT
performance (Altonji & Pierret, 2001) and that the AFQT is racially biased (Rodgers &
Spriggs, 1996). While using AFQT score creates the aforementioned problems, an observed
variable that is an alternative that measures a worker’s skills is currently unavailable. In
this paper, I use AFQT score as a proxy for workers’ skills.
Another way that job mobility affects earning differentials is through the channel of
job shopping. Job shopping motives contribute to workers’ job mobility decisions and in
turn affect wage gaps when there are differential returns by race. On the gender wage gap,
women choose jobs related to a work-life balance relative to the process of family formation.
For women that move to large firms, the gender wage gap is driven by lower bargaining
power in larger firms (Del Bono & Vuri, 2011). As for the Black-White wage gap, Black
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workers who are employed in large firms earn lower wages relative to White workers since
White workers earn significant wage premiums from greater bargaining power (Mitra, 1999).
Furthermore, within-occupation racial disparities are most observable in high-profile, private-
sector positions and can be traced to social segregation of Black and White professionals
(Grodsky & Pager, 2001). I borrow empirical methods from Del Bono & Vuri to investigate
job shopping motives of Black workers to build onto findings for the Black-White wage gap.
Amongst the literature that investigates workers’ post-labor market entry decisions on
wage gaps, researchers have empirically tested for statistical discrimination based on race
and education with AFQT score as a proxy for workers’ unobserved skills and ability. For
workers of the same level of productivity, Altonji and Pierret (2001) introduce the theory
of employer learning and find that employers statistically discriminate based on education
but not on race. Arcidiacono, Bayer, and Hizmo (2010) build onto Altonji & Pierret’s
theoretical model through the channel of information signaling and they conclude that there
is statistical discrimination based on race in the high school market but not in the college
market. While empirical papers have explained part of the Black-White wage gap with
statistical discrimination, the papers by Altonji & Pierret and Arcidiacono et al. do not
consider the role of job transitions in the early career.
Currently, there are few papers that include workers’ job changes in tests for statistical
discrimination. The employer learning process is interrupted when a worker changes jobs
since the new employer must now learn about his true productivity. If employers statistically
discriminates on race, Black workers face an initial wage penalty with the new employer.
Since workers are mobile in the early career, the observed widening of the Black wage gap
over time can be attributed to statistical discrimination. Thus, it is necessary to consider
workers’ job mobility patterns when empirically determining whether there is statistical
discrimination on the basis of race in the labor market. Of the existing literature that links
job mobility to statistical discrimination, Oettinger (1996) tests for statistical discrimination
on the basis of race during the early career of Black and White workers. Oettinger finds that
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no Black-White wage gap exists at the beginning of workers’ careers, but one develops since
Black workers reap smaller gains from job mobility relative to White workers. Oettinger does
not estimate the model separately for high school- and college-educated workers, the results
are likely biased since workers reap different returns to mobility by educational attainment.
Additionally, Oettinger does not have an unobserved proxy of ability when determining
whether there is statistical discrimination against Black workers. I expand on these findings
by using workers’ AFQT score as a proxy for unobserved human capital in my paper.
While prior relevant research has empirically shown that job transitions provide avenues
of wage and career growth for young workers and set a foundation for their lifetime earnings,
the effect of mobility on Black-White wage differentials is yet to be explored with theories
unrelated to productivity differences. Furthermore, the majority of research on the role of
job mobility on wage differences is centered on the gender wage gap. This paper assesses the
decisions made by Black workers after entering the labor market and employers’ interactions
with workers on the Black-White wage gap considering job shopping, job-specific human
capital, and statistical discrimination as theoretical foundations for the different returns to
job mobility.
3 Theoretical Framework
As described in the previous section, workers’ engagement in job mobility leads to lifetime
career and wage growth in their early careers. Yet, there are different ways that Black-White
wage differentials arise when workers choose to move jobs. First, workers’ motives behind
moving jobs vary vastly and affect wages differently through their personal choices. On the
other hand, workers’ general and job-specific skills impact how workers are compensated for
their marginal product in areas of work. Finally, employers have a large effect on wage-
setting by how they learn about workers’ unobserved ability. Below, I describe the three
theoretical channels to decompose the persistence of the Black-White wage in the context of
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job mobility.
3.1 Job Shopping Motives
Some workers choose to move jobs for purely financial reasons to increase their earnings.
Workers can also have non-pecuniary reasons for moving jobs such as relocating to be closer
to family, partaking in more relaxed work environments, or fostering more satisfactory rela-
tionships with coworkers. Generally speaking, a job-mover voluntarily seeks a new job under
the expectation that his next job is expected to yield a greater amount of utility relative to
that of his current job.
Job shopping refers to the experimentation of well-fitting jobs that accompany high rates
of mobility in the early career (Johnson, 1978). Over workers’ experience in the market,
workers determine their preferences and ability with respect to certain jobs. Workers engage
in job shopping to find a fitting job to maximize their utility while engaging in labor market
activities. Johnson’s theory presents the reasoning behind why workers engage in job mobility
due to workers’ unknown information of job-specific abilities, as well as personal preferences,
that induce them to explore different jobs or careers. Workers make a tradeoff between their
utility from working in their current job and uncertainty of returns to different jobs.
For workers that choose to move jobs for career-related and financial reasons, we may see
them moving to larger firms to receive more employee benefits or to climb the job ladder.
These changes likely have different effects on wage growth due to a worker’s gender or race.
In terms of gender differences, a female worker may face gender discrimination and thus be
less likely to receive certain benefits relative to a male worker if she is of child-bearing age.
As for racial differences, a Black worker may earn less in wages relative to a White worker
by moving to a larger firm. If workers generally have greater wage-setting power through
bargaining in larger firms, Black workers may have less bargaining power relative to White
workers. Holding all else equal, a Black worker cannot negotiate his wages to be as high
as those of a White worker’s bargained wages when he has less bargaining power. In larger
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firms, employers may be racially prejudiced against Black workers and thus be less likely to
accept higher bargained wages from Black employees.
As for the non-pecuniary reasons, a worker may move across different geographic areas
due to a personal distaste of his location or residence or to be closer to friends and family.
Black workers may face more racial prejudice from employers in different geographic locations
relative to the area’s cultural and political attitudes which leads to an observed wage gap.
The effects of job shopping on observed wage differentials leave us to question the specific
firm and social structures that disadvantage Black workers. If the job shopping channel were
to explain the Black-White wage gap, we would see that Black workers earn less in wages
relative to White workers when workers move to differently sized firms or move to a new
geographical location conditional on worker skills and observed individual characteristics.
Black and White workers might have different returns to certain firm and geographic
characteristics upon changing jobs which would contribute to the observed Black-White wage
gap. With all of that said, Black and White workers may simply value different aspects of
jobs. If Black workers are more likely to move jobs for non-pecuniary reasons, we would see
the emergence of a Black-White wage gap over the lifetime since Black workers primarily
value non-monetary aspects of work. As a result, the Black-White wage gap would instead
be driven by Black workers self-selecting into different firms.
Prior to a job transition, a worker must balance the benefit of a potential wage increase in
his new job with the cost of losing job-specific human capital accumulated in his previous job.
The direction of the effects of job shopping on the wage gap is unclear if Black and White
workers accumulate human capital at different rates. Thus, I supplement the theoretical
framework of this paper by accounting for the channel of human capital accumulation on
the Black-White wage gap.
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3.2 Human Capital
The gains from job mobility can be defined as the wage difference between the wages of
his previous and current job at the same level of tenure when controlling for general work
experience (Mincer, 1986). Immediately following a job transition, a worker’s initial wages in
his new job may be lower relative to the wage received in his previous job. Wages immediately
following a job-to-job transition can be lower for various reasons: a new worker can be less
familiar with his employer, the worker is promised a raise in the following year, or the worker
has not had time to develop new job-specific skills. When an employer compensates a worker
relative to his marginal product of labor, a worker’s earnings increase as he gains more skills
specific to his job as he accumulates more job-specific experience (tenure) with his respective
employer.
Over a worker’s tenure, a worker accumulates job-specific human capital in his current
job that may be irrelevant to a new future employer. Moving to a new job is costlier for
workers with higher pre-separation tenure since their job-specific human capital may not be
transferable to a future job. A worker who remains in his previous job for longer learns more
about employee interactions and processes that make him more productive but moving to
a new employer in the same line of work can still result in an initial wage penalty since his
previous job-specific skills become irrelevant with his new employer. In the example where
a worker has the occupation of a college professor, he accumulates skills specific to practices
in his current university (such as communicating with colleagues or navigating classrooms),
but these skills become less important when he teaches as a professor at a new university.
That said, the worker can still transfer his occupational-related skills at his new job.
On the other hand, the effect of losing job-specific human capital is exacerbated when a
worker changes his occupation with a job move. With a change in occupation, wage loss is
expected to be greater if higher levels of tenure with workers’ employers before moving jobs
translates to greater wage loss. For example, the worker who changes his occupation from a
college professor to an electrician not only loses the previously mentioned skills, but he also
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loses the technical skills related to when he held the job as a professor.
To explain the Black-White wage gap with the human capital channel, Black workers
would be expected to face greater wage loss relative to White workers when they have the
same levels of pre-separation tenure. As previously mentioned, Black workers may voluntarily
work in occupations that earn relatively less. Thus, discerning the reasons for job changes
is important for decomposing the Black-White wage gap. The observed lower returns to job
mobility can further be explained by racial discrimination in layoff decisions by employers.
If an employer must decide to fire either a Black worker or a White worker that each has
the same level of productivity, the employer may choose to fire the Black worker due to his
negative racial preferences. Thus, the Black worker would face greater wage loss from racial
discrimination from this involuntary job transition.
Further concerning job turnover, young workers tend to move jobs frequently as they
learn more about their specific skills and preferences. Voluntary job moves are more likely to
occur in the early career, while workers are more likely to face an involuntary job movement
later in their careers due to layoffs from recessions or firm closures. The stability of certain
jobs can differ by firm characteristics, industry, and part-time status during recessions or
economic uncertainty. Workers in smaller firms may face a higher likelihood of separations
due to resource limitations; part-time workers are more likely to face involuntary separations
during economic downturns; and certain industries are also likely more susceptible to face
mass layoffs relative to others, especially during economic downturns. In relation to the wage
gap, issues of selection arise if Black workers are disproportionately employed in industries
more susceptible to firm closures.
By considering the role of human capital accumulation on the Black-White wage gap,
I consider the differences in skills between Black and White workers and the potential for
greater skill loss when moving jobs. If the Black-White wage gap was attributed to differential
returns to human capital, then the amount of Black workers’ wage loss would be greater for
each additional year of tenure with their previous employers. The loss may be greater for
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Black workers if they acquire more job-specific skills or gain these unobserved skills at a faster
rate during their tenure. Assuming that workers are compensated by wages relative to their
marginal product of labor, systematic differences in Black and White workers’ productivities
only partially explain the observed wage differentials. Thus, I present the final theory on
statistical discrimination and employer learning.
3.3 Statistical Discrimination
Another explanation for racial disparities in labor market outcomes can be attributed to two
economic models of discrimination. The model of taste-based discrimination from Becker
(1957) describes discrimination as a reflection of personal prejudice or preferences. On the
other hand, the model of statistical discrimination from Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973)
refers to how an individual discriminates on another person’s observed characteristics due to
incomplete information. In this paper, I consider how statistical discrimination affects the
Black-White wage gap through job mobility.
The theory of statistical discrimination is centered on observable characteristics of workers
and learning processes. Given that an employer pays his workers respective to each worker’s
productivity, high-productive workers are paid higher wages relative to low-productive work-
ers when the employer has perfect information about the worker. In reality, the employer
has limited information on a worker’s true productivity upon hiring the worker and therefore
may statistically discriminate on a worker’s observed characteristics, such as education or
race, when paying his wages. If an employer negatively associates race (being Black) with
productivity, then the employer initially pays a Black worker less than a White worker that
has the same level of unobserved ability.
With employer learning, a Black worker would face an initial wage penalty since the
worker’s true ability is unseen by the employer. Over time, the employer learns about the
Black worker’s true productivity and relies less on race as a proxy for unobserved skills.
The Black worker reveals his true productivity to his employer and is compensated for his
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skills. Conditional on skills, the Black-White wage gap should only exist upon entry to the
labor market since the employer learns more about a Black worker’s marginal product and
no longer statistically discriminates on race. That said, the theory behind employer learning
on the wage gap only holds true if workers remain with the same employer when they are in
the labor market. In reality, workers make multiple job changes during the early career.
In the context of job mobility, the process of employer learning resets with a worker’s new
employer when the worker changes jobs. Since the new employer does not have the same in-
formation on the worker’s productivity relative to his old employer, a high-productive worker
faces a larger wage loss in comparison to a low-productive worker. If a Black worker’s pre-
vious employer and new employer both statistically discriminate on race, the Black worker
again faces an initial wage penalty after changing jobs. If all employers generally statisti-
cally discriminate by race, a Black worker that moves more frequently faces a greater wage
penalty relative to an immobile Black worker since the new employer does not have the same
information as the previous employer on the mobile Black worker’s true productivity. In
the presence of statistical discrimination by race, the Black-White wage gap would therefore
widen over time when workers engage in job changes throughout their early careers due to
the repeated cycles of the employer learning process.
While research on taste-based discrimination is important to further decompose the
Black-White wage gap,1 the data used in this paper is more suitable for testing whether
there is statistical discrimination. When employers statistically discriminate on race, the
data would show that Black workers have an initial wage penalty upon moving but Black
workers’ wages would not grow at a rate that is different from that of White workers. Fur-
thermore, the returns to worker productivity would be positive over time. Under statistical
discrimination and job mobility, Black workers would face a wage penalty after every job
change throughout the early career.
Theoretically, the effects of job mobility are ambiguous on Black and White workers’
1See Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Charles and Guryan (2013), and Castillo et al. (2013) for research
on taste-based discrimination.
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relative earnings when considering different channels that contribute to the wage differentials.
Job mobility can lead to a large loss in wages with greater human capital accumulation when
there is skill mismatch or discrimination; while on the other hand, a job transition can also
lead to higher earnings when the worker moves voluntarily for career-related reasons to
improve his potential earnings. I investigate whether any of these theoretical channels can
explain the observed Black-White wage gap over time. Given that workers’ motives, abilities,
and outside discrimination are unobserved, the empirical methodology in this paper uses
proxies for job-specific human capital accumulation and workers’ unobserved skills from the
NLSY.
4 Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) is a nationally representative panel
data set that consists of 12,686 young men and women that were 14-22 years of age at the
first interview in 1979. The surveys were conducted annually from 1979 to 1994 and then
moved to a biennial schedule thereafter until its end in 2016. The NLSY captures detailed
information on individuals’ work history and job characteristics such as workers’ firm size
and industry, voluntary or involuntary job transitions, and worker’s job expectations. Most
importantly, the NLSY data contains rich information on workers’ employment histories in
weekly and yearly arrays which allows for detailed construction of work history variables.
For the empirical analysis, I use the waves of NLSY data spanning the years of 1979-2002.
As for the sample, I only include White and Black male respondents who have completed
either 12 or 16 years of formal education, where individuals have only received a high school
diploma or college degree, respectively. Workers of mixed race are not included in the sample.
Hispanic individuals are also dropped from the sample due to the confounding effects of
immigration. I exclude female respondents from the sample to account for the confounding
effect of fertility decisions and the limited sample of Black female respondents in the NLSY
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cohort. Furthermore, I exclude men who have enrolled in the military to center my study
on civilian employees.
Since this paper focuses solely on individuals after entering the labor market, I exclude
observations before respondents’ last year of education and restrict the sample to individuals
who do not enroll in additional years of schooling between successive years of employment.
Including these individuals would disrupt their potential experience. I additionally exclude
observations in which workers are self-employed or work without pay since this paper consid-
ers the role of employers in wage determination. Respondent errors, inconsistent interview
dates, and coding errors make it difficult to render weekly job arrays that include every
possible job change with accurate measures of tenure and employer identification. Thus, I
determine workers’ main job as the job they worked for the most weeks in each survey year.
Furthermore, I limit the sample up to the year 2002 since the sample of respondents after
2002 is insufficient for data analysis and would therefore bias the estimates and results of
this paper. Lastly, I exclude observations with hourly real wages less than $1 and more than
$100, which drops 493 observations
After determining workers’ main jobs for each year, a job move is coded as 1 if the worker’s
employer in the previous year is not equal to his current employer. Since respondents vary
in age at the beginning of the NLSY survey year, I standardize AFQT scores for respondents
within each age group. The standardized AFQT score is used in place of the raw AFQT
score since AFQT scores vary by age and using the raw AFQT score would be an inaccurate
proxy for ability. For example, an older respondent’s AFQT score is likely greater than
a younger respondent’s score, but it does not necessarily mean the older respondent has
greater general ability than the younger respondent does. The younger respondent may
actually have a relatively high AFQT score in comparison to the other respondents of his
same age.
The standardized AFQT score is constructed by finding the average AFQT score in the
individual’s age group and subtracting the individual’s actual AFQT score from the average,
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and then dividing this value by the standard deviation of AFQT within his age group. For
workers’ time in the labor market, potential experience is measured as the number of years
from their first graduation date. Individuals in this sample have up to 15 years of potential
experience to capture job changes at the beginning of their careers. I place the define a
worker’s first 15 years in the labor market as the early career where mobility is the most
important for wage growth. To measure labor market outcomes with hourly nominal wages,
I index workers’ real wages to the base year of 2000 with yearly Consumer Price Index (CPI)
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The NLSY presents a cumulative measure of
a worker’s tenure in weeks and indicates if an individual’s employer has changed from the
previous survey year. I divide a worker’s reported tenure by 50 to measure tenure in years
and further create a lagged variable of tenure.
As for the controls in my model, I create indicators for firm size since respondents give a
range or an exact number in the data. Workers who work 30 hours or less per week in their
reported job are coded as part-time. With the survey responses relating to the respondent’s
answer of leaving their previous job, I classify a job move as involuntary if he responds
with lay-offs or plant closures, fired, or work program ended, and voluntary job moves if he
responds with quit. Since the occupation coding changes over decades in the NLSY, I limit
the occupation variable to a set of seven dummies. Full descriptions of variable construction
are located in Appendix A.
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of relevant variables for the total
sample of 2,515 workers and 17,846 unique person-year observations used for analysis. Full
summary statistics are located in Table A2. As expected, the raw data shows that there is
a difference in earnings between college- and high school-educated workers, as the average
nominal and log of nominal wages are higher for college workers in both White and Black
categories. Across the board, Black workers with a high school degree have the lowest average
log hourly wage and average standardized AFQT score. Interestingly, this sub-sample of
workers also has the highest average number of total jobs and lowest average tenure. High
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Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics
High School College
White Black White Black
Nominal Hourly Wage 12.256 10.145 18.680 17.657
(5.598) (4.762) (9.026) (8.520)
Log Hourly Wage 2.411 2.230 2.816 2.769
(0.443) (0.409) (0.485) (0.466)
Potential Experience 7.647 8.247 6.730 7.383
(3.974) (3.950) (3.938) (4.031)
Tenure 3.205 2.556 3.678 3.743
(3.302) (2.861) (3.494) (3.544)
AFQT 0.264 -0.824 1.110 0.365
(0.786) (0.767) (0.457) (0.748)
Total Jobs 4.912 6.248 4.132 4.632
(2.904) (3.445) (2.492) (2.431)
Mobility Variables (%)
Stayed at Job 57.2 50.0 65.4 63.6
Moved Jobs 42.8 50.0 34.6 36.4
Voluntary 71.1 63.2 80.0 83.9
Involuntary 28.9 36.8 20.0 16.1
Individuals 1280 597 532 106
Observations 9127 4198 3764 757
Notes: Standard deviations are in the parentheses below means. The percentages of voluntary and involun-
tary moves are taken within the sample of those who engage in a job move. Nominal hourly wage reported
are in 2000 USD.
school-educated workers who engage in a job move also have the highest percentages of
involuntary movements relative to college-educated workers which indicates that there is
some type of selection between the two groups. For example, high school-educated workers
may be more willing to move jobs for non-wage reasons, while college-educated may only
make job transitions for career-related reasons. The sample of Black workers (especially
those in the college market) is small and likely is not representative of the population and
the inferences drawn from the summary statistics should be made carefully.
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5 Empirical Model
The theoretical framework discussed in Section 3 guides the design of the empirical model
with observed variables in the data. Equation (1) is the model that investigates the roles of
statistical discrimination and human capital, while Equation (2) presents additional mod-
ifications to Equation (1) to explore the job shopping channel on the Black-White wage
gap.
First, I estimate the following ordinary least squares equation for log hourly wages, wit,
on job mobility and race,
wit = φ(Xit, Nit−1) + β0 + β1Bi + β2Mit + β3BitMit + β4Biφ(.) + β5Mitφ(.)
+ β6BiMitφ(.) + ciθ + ciXitΘ + K
′
itγ + δt + εit,
(1)
where Bi is the race indicator equal to one if worker i is Black and Mit is an indicator
equivalent to one if worker i has a new employer in year t. Since job-specific human capital
is crucial in workers’ mobility decisions and wages, the term φ(Xit, Nit−1) in Equation (1)
denotes a non-linear function of human capital,
φ(Xit, Nit−1) = α1Xit + α2X
2
it + α3Nit−1 + α4N
2
it−1,
where Xit denotes potential experience at year t and Nit−1 denotes tenure in the year t−1. In
Equation (1), the coefficient on Bi estimates the Black-White wage gap at the beginning of
young workers’ careers. The returns to potential experience and previous tenure are expected
to have a positive effect on log wages since workers increase their wages with human capital
over time. The interactions between the Black indicator and human capital function capture
how Black workers have different returns to potential experience and tenure over time in
the labor market. Given by the interaction between Black and φ(.), the coefficient on BiXit
can be interpreted as the average growth of the racial wage gap for each additional year
in the labor market. I render the OLS assumption that the relationship between log wage
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and race is linear over experience for the sake of result interpretation. In the data, the true
relationship between log wages and race is actually non-linear: White workers reap higher
returns to experience over time relative to Black workers. The violation of the linearity
assumption may overestimate the magnitude of the Black-White wage gap at higher levels
of potential experience.
The coefficient on Mit estimates the initial effect of a job transition on wages and the
interaction of Mit with Bi captures the wage difference between Black and White workers
upon a job move. The job move dummy is interacted with the human capital function since
the effect on wages varies over time in the labor market. The triple interaction term of Black
indicator, job move dummy, and potential experience renders the racial wage gap in returns
to job mobility over time. This triple interaction term would be negative if Black workers’
returns to potential experience are negatively impacted when they change jobs.
The estimates for the race and job move interactions with previous tenure are expected to
have the same directional effect on wages. A negative coefficient on the interaction between
tenure and job moving can translate to a loss in job-specific human capital in the form of
an observed wage penalty. If Black workers face a larger extent of wage loss through the
forfeiture of job-specific skills after job moving, we would expect to see a significant negative
coefficient in the triple interaction term between Black, job moving, and previous tenure.
With these interaction variables, I estimate the Black-White wage gap and its persistence
over time for when workers make job transitions in the early career.
Next, the term ci in Equation (1) captures the individual’s ability and is proxied by the
respondent’s age-standardized AFQT score from the NLSY. The proxy ci is unobserved to
the employer but observed by the econometrician. If the worker’s ability is initially unknown
to the employer, then the coefficient on AFQT should be insignificant. I include AFQT and
an interaction with potential experience to investigate whether a worker’s productivity is
revealed to the employer over time. If employer learning occurs, then the AFQT and po-
tential experience interaction term should be positively correlated with the worker’s wages.
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I additionally include a triple interaction of AFQT, potential experience, and job moving.
The triple interaction between ability, potential experience, and job move accounts for the
interruption of the employer learning process when a worker changes jobs. The triple inter-
action is expected to be negative since the worker’s new employer does not have the same
information on the worker’s productivity relative to the previous employer.
Firm- and individual-specific time-variant controls are captured in the vector K′it. These
controls include sets of indicators for region and urban residence, firm size (small, medium,
and large), occupation, and part-time status of worker i in year t, as well as these vari-
ables interacted with potential experience Xit. I include interactions of these time-variant
characteristics with potential experience since these variables may have different effects on
a worker’s wage later in their careers from their first year in the labor market. δt is a set
of year dummies that control for year fixed effects. The presence of time-specific shocks,
such as recessions, affects worker mobility and wages and would bias the results if omitted.
During economic recessions, workers would move jobs during a temporary layoff and wages
would be affected. Finally, εit is the error term.
To further explore the Black-White wage gap, I test for the effect of different job shopping
motives on wages. The effect of job mobility may be confounded with specific changes in
employer- or firm-specific characteristics or geographical differences. For example, if a job
mover transitions to a non-urban location where his previous job was located in an urban
area, he may have a more negative effect on his earnings relative to job-movers who remain
within the same area. Changes in these characteristics may differentiate by race as well.
White workers may face a wage penalty when moving to a smaller firm, but the penalty
may be greater for Black workers when they make the same type of job move. With the
same variables specified in Equation (1), I estimate log wages on workers’ changes in firm
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characteristics and geography,









it + ciθ + ciXitΘ + K
′
itγ + δt + εit,
(2)
where DKit is a vector of dummy variables equal to one if a variable of set K′it in time t is not
equivalent to the characteristic in time t− 1.2 That is, there is an observed change in some
characteristic of K′it in the current period relative to the previous period. Variables captured
in DKit are divided into two types: changes in firm- or employer-specific characteristics and
changes in geographic location. For the changes in firm and employer characteristics, groups
of indicators include moving to a larger firm and moving to a smaller firm; and a worker
changes his occupation. The dummy for occupation changes is only available for job-movers
since a change in occupation necessarily means that a worker has moved jobs. The dummies
for geographic changes include a set of dummies equal to one if the worker moves from an
urban to non-urban residence and vice versa; and if the worker moves from one region to
one of the three different regions. The reference group for each variable is where the worker
does not have a change in firm-related characteristics or geographic location.
Equation (2) estimates heterogeneous effects for both job-movers and job-stayers. I in-
clude job-stayers in this model because they may have a change in a firm- or geographic-
specific characteristic but not endure a job transition. A situation that this model would
capture would be the effect on a job-stayers’ wages when the size of his firm grows yet he
remains employed at the same job in consecutive periods.
Determining the true motives of job changes is rather difficult due to data limitations.
Data on job satisfaction is only present for four years in the data and is insufficient for rele-
vant empirical analysis to determine whether a worker moves for purely pecuniary reasons.
Since the data on reasons behind workers’ job separations is not detailed to make robust
2I adapt the model from Del Bono and Vuri (2011), where the authors estimate changes in firm charac-
teristics on the gender wage gap in Italy.
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assumptions, I place certain assumptions on the types of observed changes with job moves.
Changes in occupations and firm characteristics can be seen as career reasons and geographic
changes can be interpreted as non-wage reasons and preferences. I estimate Equation (2) for
workers who voluntarily change jobs to follow the theory behind job shopping.
When using OLS to estimate the effects of job mobility on wages, there may be unob-
served variables that would bias the results. While a model of OLS with cluster standard
errors accounts for the panel data structure and the non-independent observations, OLS
assumes there are no unobserved time-invariant variables correlated with the error term.
Unobserved time-invariant variables could include attitudes about work, such as an individ-
ual who chooses to work new jobs for fun versus an individual who is determined to move up
the job ladder in a specific career. In contrast to OLS, the use of fixed effects operates under
the assumption that there are unobserved time-invariant variables that are correlated with
the job mobility patterns of workers. While a fixed effects model is suitable for the structure
of the data set to remove bias from unobserved individual-specific variables that may bias
the results, the Black variable would be excluded from the model since it is time-invariant.
Dropping the Black indicator would remove estimates on the initial Black-White wage gap.
Given the panel structure of the data set, I estimate my main results with Huber-White
standard errors to account for correlation at the individual level over time.
I estimate Equations (1) and (2) separately for high school and college-educated workers
due to bias attributed to the college wage premium and systematic differences between the
two educational groups. Since my empirical analysis only includes workers to have 12 or 16
years of education, I do not need to include a variable for years of education. In Section
6, the results for Equation (1) that exclude tenure controls are located in Table 2 and full
results that include tenure are presented in Table 3. Estimates of job-movers from Equation
(2) are shown in Table 4.
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6 Results
In the following tables, I present the empirical results of job mobility on the Black-White
wage gap. The outcome of wages can be interpreted as a one percent increase in wages.
Since there is no significant Black-White wage gap in the college market from Equation (1)
and thereafter, I restrict my interpretations on the empirical results for high school-educated
workers in this section. Additional results for the sample of college-educated workers and
the pooled sample of all workers can be found in the Appendix.
Table 2 presents the baseline OLS estimates of race on log wages to decompose the
Black-White wage gap from Equation (1). There is a Black-White wage gap upon entry
into the labor market and the gap widens over time, as shown by the estimates in columns
(1) and (2). After adding controls for AFQT in columns (3) and (4), the initial wage
gap disappears but the wage gap continues to grow over time.3 Without controlling for job
mobility Black workers are expected to earn 0.88% less in wages relative to White workers for
each additional year in the labor market, holding all else constant. After controlling for job
mobility in column (5), these differential returns to experience disappear which shows that
job-movers drive the widening of the Black-White wage gap. Most notably, Black workers
earn about 0.78% less relative to White job-movers for every additional year of experience
when they change jobs. The findings show that there is no wage gap at the beginning of
workers’ careers, but a wage gap forms since Black workers reap fewer gains in job mobility.
While the magnitude of the wage gap does not seem large when taken at face value, Black
workers earn 1.5 less than White workers when comparing the returns to experience for Black
job-movers to White job-movers. White job-movers earn an expected 0.52% increase in wages
for every year in the labor market and Black workers’ returns are nearly 150% less than those
of their White counterparts. Since these initial findings show that the Black-White wage
gap manifests through job mobility, I further explore the three different theoretical channels
3Figure 1 presents the visual of the estimated wage gap over potential experience for high school-educated
workers of the regression specifications in columns (1), (2), and (4) in Table 2.
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Figure 1: Log Wage Gap Over Time
Notes: Graphs present the non-linear returns to potential experience of White workers relative to Black
workers in the high school market with a quadratic fitted line. All estimates include year fixed effects.
Shaded areas display 95% confidence intervals.
that can explain the observed gap in lifetime wage differentials.
6.1 Statistical Discrimination
If race is a signal for workers’ productivity, then the effect of a worker being Black should
negatively impact his initial wages since the employers believe that productivity is negatively
related to being Black upon hiring. Through employer learning, the effect of AFQT is more
important over time and the effect of being Black is lessened over time as the worker’s
employer learns about the worker’s true productivity. If employers statistically discriminate
on the basis of race, we should see a significant negative coefficient on the Black term
after controlling for AFQT over time since the Black workers face a wage penalty upon
hiring. Furthermore, the effect of being Black over time should become insignificant or less
negative since the employer no longer relies on the worker’s observed race as a signal of his
productivity.
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Table 2: Effect of Race and Job Mobility on Log Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black -0.0530∗∗ -0.0611∗∗ 0.0254 -0.0070 -0.0618 -0.0563
(0.0244) (0.0241) (0.0265) (0.0276) (0.0414) (0.0418)
Potential Experience 0.0851∗∗∗ 0.0864∗∗∗ 0.0923∗∗∗ 0.0771∗∗∗ 0.0658∗∗∗ 0.0668∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0126) (0.0126)
Black × Potential Experience -0.0173∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.0129∗∗∗ -0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0010 0.0018
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0038)
AFQT Score 0.0863∗∗∗ 0.0287∗∗ 0.0379∗∗ 0.0430∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0144) (0.0150) (0.0156)




Black × Move 0.0535 0.0531
(0.0358) (0.0358)
Move × Potential Experience 0.0052∗ 0.0058∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0028)
Black × Move × Potential Experience -0.0078∗ -0.0118∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0043)
Move × AFQT Score × Potential Experience -0.0039∗∗∗
(0.0015)
Additional Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13325 13325 13325 13325 13325 13325
R2 0.1170 0.2417 0.2640 0.2631 0.3136 0.3144
Notes: The results are presented for workers with a high school degree. All specifications include constants
and dummy controls for year fixed effects and potential experience squared. Columns (2) to (6) include ad-
ditional controls for region, urban, occupation, part-time status, firm size, and interactions of these dummies
with potential experience. Huber-White standard errors shown in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
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As mentioned in the theoretical framework, employers learn about a worker’s productivity
over time. When excluding the AFQT and potential experience interaction in column (3) of
Table 2, the Black-White wage gap is expected to widen by 1.29% for each additional year in
the labor market and there is an insignificant wage gap upon entry. In column (4), I identify
a positive and significant coefficient on the AFQT and potential experience interaction of
0.0074 which shows that employers learn about the worker’s true productivity over time
and his wages are therefore positively with his productivity. The Black-White wage slightly
converges and we see that Black workers are now estimated to earn 0.88% less in wages
relative to White workers for each additional year in the labor market. Interestingly, the
coefficient on Black becomes negative (-0.0070) but remains insignificant. Similar to the
findings of Altonji & Pierret, the results presented in columns (3) and (4) do not provide
strong evidence on whether or not employers statistically discriminate on race because the
Black-White wage gap should be insignificant over time when controlling for productivity
interacted with AFQT.
That said, these estimates do not consider the role of job mobility on worker’s wages.
Theoretically, the Black-White wage gap should converge over time when there is employer
learning over time but this process is truncated when a Black worker switches jobs. When
workers switch jobs through their lifetimes, the employer learning process must re-start
whenever the worker changes employers. If employer learning resets with each job change,
then wages are correlated with a worker’s ability when he stays at his current job as opposed
to when he changes jobs. When employers statistically discriminate on race, Black workers
face a larger wage penalty relative to white workers when they move jobs.
The key result in column (5) shows that Black workers earn 0.78% less in wages relative to
White workers when they change jobs for each additional year in the labor force. Conditional
on skills, this shows that a Black worker who moves to a new job earns significantly less in
wages compared to a White worker. This shows that a Black worker faces a wage penalty
upon moving jobs and this effect is greater if they change employers later in the early
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career. Since the interaction between race and potential experience is now insignificant, the
results suggest that Black workers no longer face a wage penalty over the early career when
remaining with the same employer. Since Black workers face a wage penalty upon moving,
the result is consistent with statistical discrimination if employers rely on race as a proxy
for productivity. The AFQT and potential experience interaction term remains positive and
significant, meaning that the employer continues to learn about the worker’s productivity
over time.
Including the triple interaction term between AFQT, potential experience, and job-
moving indicator in column (6) accounts for the effect of a job change on how employers
perceive the worker’s productivity. The negative coefficient of -0.0039 on the triple interac-
tion term of job changing, AFQT, and potential experience indicates that there is a negative
effect on wages upon changing employers for relatively high productive workers. This is
consistent with employer learning since new the employer does not have the same informa-
tion as the old employer does on the worker’s productivity which is negatively reflected in
a job-movers wage loss when the worker is more productive relative to his colleagues. The
information on productivity resets for all workers upon a job move. Furthermore, the neg-
ative coefficient of -0.0118 on the triple interaction term among the Black indicator, move
dummy, and potential experience becomes more negative and significant in column (6) which
indicates that race and productivity are negatively correlated. While a new employer does
not have information on the worker’s productivity, the more negative coefficient on the triple
interaction term suggests that employers negatively associate race with productivity to deter-
mine a worker’s wages. The Black and potential experience interaction remains insignificant,
meaning that the gap in returns to experience does not widen over the early career when a
Black worker remains with the same employer.
The evidence suggests that statistical discrimination on the basis of race contributes to
the observed Black-White wage differentials over time. As shown by the estimates in column
(6), Black workers face a wage penalty from re-starting the employer learning process when
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they transition to a new job. While Altonji & Pierret do not find evidence of statistical
discrimination on race, they exclude the role of job mobility in their analysis. After I
consider workers’ job transitions made in the early career, the empirical evidence suggests
that job mobility likely affects the Black-White wage gap through the channel of statistical
discrimination.
6.2 Human Capital
In general, workers would be expected to have positive returns to tenure since they accu-
mulate job-specific skills when actively working with their current employers. Upon a job
transition, the loss in these job-specific skills would yield a loss in wages with his new em-
ployer. In the context of the Black-White wage gap, the loss in wages after changing jobs
should be greater for Black workers. Given that job-specific human capital and skill match-
ing have a large effect on the moving decisions and wages of workers, I investigate how the
loss of job-specific skills impacts workers’ wages in column (1) of Table 3. After controlling
for workers’ previous tenure, the estimated returns to potential experience for Black job-
movers remains negative but is less significant. Holding all else constant, the model shows
that wages are estimated to increase by 5.68% on average for every additional year of tenure
in the previous survey year for workers that do not engage in a job-to-job transition. For
workers that engage in a job change, they are predicted to have a 1.55% decrease in wages
for every additional year of tenure accumulated in the previous job.
The results in column (1) do not fully capture how workers are heterogeneous in the
amount of human capital that they have accumulated. Black and White workers’ wages
may reflect the difference in the returns to productivity when they are employed. Thus,
I include interactions with Black in column (2) to determine whether the widening of the
Black-White wage gap is related to the amount of tenure that a worker accumulates prior to
changing jobs. Black workers do not face significantly different returns to tenure relative to
White workers, but they face a greater wage penalty when they accumulate larger amounts
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Potential Experience 0.0978∗∗∗ 0.0988∗∗∗
(0.0178) (0.0177)




Black × Move 0.0209 0.0310
(0.0459) (0.0456)
Move × Potential Experience 0.0014 0.0001
(0.0032) (0.0034)




AFQT × Potential Experience 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0062∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0017)
Move × AFQT × Potential Experience -0.0045∗∗∗ -0.0046∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Tenure (t− 1) 0.0568∗∗∗ 0.0546∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0072)
Move × Tenure (t− 1) -0.0155∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0050)
Black × Tenure (t− 1) 0.0085
(0.0059)




Notes: All specifications include constants and dummy controls for year fixed effects, potential experience
squared, previous tenure squared, and dummies for region, urban, occupation, part-time status, class, firm
size, and interactions of these dummies with potential experience. Huber-White standard errors shown in
parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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of tenure in his job before changing employers. For every additional year of tenure that a
Black worker accumulates in his previous job, he is expected to lose an additional 1.74% in
wages compared to a White worker, ceteris paribus. Notably, the loss in wages for Black
workers is nearly twice the amount of White workers’ wage loss when changing jobs at the
same amount of tenure.
The findings in column (2) give rise to multiple theoretical explanations. First, the nega-
tive coefficients on the interaction terms between tenure and job-changing can be explained
as a loss of job-specific skills acquired in the workers’ previous job or a mismatch in skills.
If the job-specific human capital is higher in the workers’ old job, there is a new learning
process that the worker must engage in with his new employer and career. Since the effect is
significantly more negative for Black workers, it is possible that Black workers do not engage
in job search as efficiently relative to White workers and thus have more difficulty with the
matching process.
Another possible explanation can be that Black workers do not have as much informa-
tion relative to White workers on their particular skills and therefore they may experiment
with jobs across different occupations. Alternatively, the negative coefficient on the triple
interaction between the Black indicator, move dummy, and previous tenure can imply that
Black workers in the high school market accumulate job-specific skills at a faster rate over
the length of tenure as a White worker. Furthermore, Black workers may be more likely
to work in industries in which the on-the-job skills he accumulates are more specific to his
current job and less transferable to other jobs.
While the higher loss of wages can be explained by the loss of job-specific human capital
from the previous job or a mismatch in skills, there are a few issues with this interpretation.
Another explanation for this finding is that a worker’s wages may be extremely high in his
prior job relative to his current job which is not necessarily related to wage growth from his
tenure. If a worker’s previous wages are higher than his current wages, the question arises on
why he chose to move jobs. Black workers may additionally work in industries that are more
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susceptible to layoffs and thus are more likely to face an involuntary separation. Transitioning
from a higher to lower wage job can be further explained by determining whether his job
change was voluntary or involuntary. I obtain similar results when controlling for involuntary
job transitions (Table B3). Since there is a reasonably large amount of missing data regarding
the reasons why workers leave their jobs, the sample size falls to 9,963 observations.
After including controls for whether the job transition was involuntary, the negative
effect of moving jobs with respect to previous tenure becomes larger for Black workers.
For workers that move involuntarily, it is expected that Black workers would have greater
wage loss relative to higher amounts of tenure accumulated in their previous jobs. Yet, the
evidence suggests that Black workers do not have a significantly higher wage loss relative to
White workers when moving involuntarily.
When evaluating how different types of job movements affect wages, problems with selec-
tion bias arise if Black and White workers change jobs for systematically different reasons.
If Black movers relatively more often work in industries in which there are more layoffs, then
selection prevents the determination of a causal relationship between mobility and tenure
on the wage gap. Furthermore, responses bias likely affects these estimates since survey re-
spondents can refuse to answer or inaccurately answer the question on the reason for leaving
their previous jobs. This source of bias can be remedied by utilizing robust administrative
data that shows whether the workers’ previous firm shut down or faced financial difficulties
that resulted in mass layoffs.
While multiple stories explain of the empirical results in Table 3, we can still conclude
that Black workers face a greater extent of wage loss with respect to the tenure accumulated
in their previous job. That said, Table 3 strengthens the theory that statistical discrimination
has a role in the early career Black-White wage gap. Assuming that employers learn over
the course of workers’ tenure, employer learning occurs since Black workers do not have
differential returns to tenure. Instead, Black workers face a wage penalty at the time of a
job transition since the new employer does not have the same information relative to the
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worker’s previous employer.
6.3 Job Shopping Motives
Finally, I investigate whether different job shopping motives contribute to the Black-White
wage gap over time. Black workers who move jobs while simultaneously enacting a change
in firm or geographic characteristics should face a wage penalty. I present the estimates of
Equation (2) without interactions between the Black indicator and variables DKit in column
(1) of Table 4 to examine the general heterogeneous effects by job changes of voluntary job-
movers. The results regarding changes in career-related reasons indicate that workers who
move to a smaller firm earn about 7.35% less in averages relative to a worker that does not
change firm sizes during a job transition. Additionally, workers who change occupations earn
a significant loss of 9.51% in wages relative to a worker that remains in the same occupation
after a job move. The estimated wage loss associated with an occupation change confirms
the expectation that wages are negatively impacted by the loss of job-specific human capital.
As for the geographic changes, workers who move to an urban location from a non-urban
location face an expected loss of 9.51% in wages in comparison to a job-mover who does not
move to a different urban area.
Column (2) includes interactions between firm and worker characteristic changes and the
Black indicator. The terms interacted with race in the regression discern whether there are
differential returns for changes in industry-related characteristics. If Black workers faced
an additional wage penalty associated with career-related motives for changing, then we
would see a significant and negative coefficient on the changes in occupation or firm size
interacted with the Black indicator. I find no significant wage differences between Black and
White workers when workers move to a larger or smaller firm relative to their previous jobs
and when they change occupations. The insignificant coefficient on the interaction between
Black and changed occupations may show that Black workers do not actually not suffer from
human capital-related losses mentioned in the previous subsection.
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Table 4: Effect of Race and Job Mobility on Log Wages with Job Shopping Motives
(1) (2) (3)
Black 0.0276 -0.0017 0.0222
(0.0462) (0.0503) (0.0466)
Potential Experience 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034)
Black × Potential Experience -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0047
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0056)
Tenure (t− 1) -0.0119∗∗ -0.0121∗∗ -0.0120∗∗
(0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050)
Black × Tenure (t− 1) -0.0174∗∗ -0.0168∗∗ -0.0171∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0085)
Moved to a smaller firm -0.0735∗∗∗ -0.0710∗∗ -0.0726∗∗∗
(0.0252) (0.0286) (0.0252)
Moved to a larger firm -0.0343 -0.0440 -0.0338
(0.0247) (0.0292) (0.0248)
Changed Occupations -0.0951∗∗∗ -0.1117∗∗∗ -0.0958∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0178) (0.0140)
Moved to urban -0.0951∗ -0.0966∗ -0.1186∗
(0.0555) (0.0554) (0.0605)
Moved to non-urban -0.0697 -0.0698 -0.0589
(0.0453) (0.0453) (0.0496)
Moved regions -0.0678 -0.0690 -0.0795
(0.0799) (0.0799) (0.0832)
Black × Moved to a smaller firm -0.0051
(0.0335)
Black × Moved to a larger firm 0.0225
(0.0313)
Black × Changed Occupations 0.0442
(0.0284)
Black × Moved to urban 0.0887
(0.0667)
Black × Moved to non-urban -0.0435
(0.0693)
Black × Moved regions 0.0380
(0.0555)
Observations 11182 11182 11182
R2 0.3141 0.3143 0.3142
Notes: The results are presented for workers with a high school degree. The regressions include identical
controls used in Table 3. Only results for job-movers are presented in the table. Huber-White standard
errors shown in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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In column (3), I add the interactions between geographic changes and the Black dummy
variable. Geographic changes that accompany a worker’s job change can be motivated by
familial reasons or personal preferences for his location of residence. If non-wage reasons
for changing jobs contributed to the Black-White wage gap, we would see negative and
significant estimates on the geographic change dummies with the Black indicator variable.
The results show no significant wage differences between Black and White workers when the
job move is associated with a geographic change.
I do not find sufficient evidence to conclude that racial differences in job shopping motives
have a role in the widening of the Black-White wage gap over time. Given the findings in
Table 4, it is important to determine whether the data capture changes in firm or worker
characteristics and geography for Black and White workers. For example, if the data capture
more White workers changing occupations and few Black workers, I cannot conclude that
Black workers face no significant wage penalties when they also change occupations. The full
summary statistics (in the Data Appendix) show that this does give rise to these concerns
since there is enough data on Black workers’ job changes to compare to White workers.
That said, these results on job shopping motives may be susceptible to self-selection. Black
and White workers may systematically be different when selecting certain characteristics
for their new job. On the other hand, the results from Tables 2 and 3 remain robust
after examining the heterogeneous effects of job changing. Thus, the empirical results in
this section show that job shopping motives have a relatively lower or insignificant role in
explaining the Black-White wage gap relative to the channels of statistical discrimination
and human capital accumulation.
7 Conclusion
Using data from the NLSY, I find that Black workers reap fewer returns to job mobility
relative to White workers in the high school market. Conditional on skills, high school-
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educated Black workers who make job transitions fare worse relative to White workers.
Furthermore, Black workers have greater levels of wage loss after changing jobs when they
have higher levels of pre-separation tenure. The empirical results indicate that job mobility
has a considerable role in the observed evolution of the Black-White wage gap.
The results are consistent with the two theoretical channels of statistical discrimination
and human capital accumulation, but there is inconclusive evidence to suggest whether or
not changes in firm or geographic characteristics contribute to the Black-White wage gap.
With statistical discrimination, employers that negatively associate race and productivity
initially pay a Black worker relatively less than a White worker of the same unobserved
skill. When Black workers engage in job mobility, they face a wage penalty due to statistical
discrimination by race for each new employer in addition to the wage loss from the worker’s
unrevealed ability to his new employer. When testing for differential returns to job-specific
human capital, I find that Black workers face larger amounts of wage loss at greater levels
pre-separation tenure. That said, many explanations in the context of the human capital
channel can explain the observed wage gap.
When looking at employer and geographic changes that accompany job-to-job transitions,
changes in occupations negatively affect both Black and White workers’ wages. Interestingly,
the Black-White difference in the wage loss from changing occupations is insignificant. As-
suming that human capital is specific to certain occupations, the results contradict the theory
that the Black-White wage gap is driven by wage penalties from the loss of job-specific hu-
man capital. Additional evidence is needed to further determine the theoretical mechanisms
behind the racial differences in human capital accumulation. Tenure is not likely an accu-
rate proxy for job-specific human capital accumulation. Overall, it is difficult to disentangle
whether lifetime Black-White wage differentials are explained by statistical discrimination or
employer learning, or even a combination of the two theories. When a Black worker remains
with the same employer, it is unclear as to whether the worker is accumulating job-specific
human capital differently or there is employer learning during his tenure.
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This paper provides additional directions in research to further investigate how the Black-
White wage gap develops through workers’ post-market entry decisions. Primarily, the three
theoretical channels investigated in this paper should be studied further in-depth while con-
ducting research on the Black-White wage gap. The empirical findings suggest that job mo-
bility should be considered when estimating whether employers statistically discriminate on
race. Influential papers on employer learning and statistical discrimination, such as Altonji
& Pierret, omit the role of job mobility from analysis and rule out statistical discrimination
on the basis of race. Furthermore, the results on the wage gap in the college market are
inconclusive due to the limitations in the data and sample selection. The restriction imposed
on dropping workers that have non-consecutive years of schooling results in a generally lim-
ited sample but this especially impacted the sample of college-educated workers. Future
research should consider obtaining more robust longitudinal data on workers’ mobility that
better investigates the Black-White wage gap among college-educated workers. Lastly, the
complexity of research on the Black-White wage gap calls for different theoretical avenues
to be explored through structural models. Since purely observable worker characteristics
cannot fully explain the wage differentials, future research should continue to use theoretical
models to decompose the Black-White wage gap.
The findings have policy implications that target the observed Black-White earning dif-
ferentials over the lifetime. Since pre-market productivity differences in Black and White
workers continue to drive part of the wage gap, policy involving investment in young Black
workers includes widely and equitably increasing job-specific skills training before the comple-
tion of formal education. In the workplace, policy regarding anti-discrimination enforcement
in hiring and pay is needed so that Black workers are compensated for their skills instead of
facing wage loss simply from their observed race. Ultimately, research on the Black-White
wage gap is critical from an equity standpoint given that disparate labor market outcomes
have persistently stifled economic prosperity and generational mobility for Black workers.
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Table A1: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Black 0: Worker is White
1: Worker is Black
Potential Experience Years since last reported graduation date;
Otherwise interpreted as the years that the respondent could
have been working in the labor force upon ending his formal
education.
Tenure Consecutive weeks with the respondent’s employer in year t
divided by 50 for tenure in yearly units
AFQT Score Age-standardized AFQT score
Constructed by finding the average AFQT score in the respon-
dent’s age group and subtracting the individual’s actual AFQT
score from the average, and then dividing this value by the
standard deviation of AFQT within his age group
Move An observed job change based on whether or not the respon-
dent had a different employer in year t relative to year t− 1.
0: Stayed at job in year t; the respondent had the same em-
ployer in year t and in year t− 1
1: Changed jobs in year t; the respondent had different em-
ployer in year t and in t− 1
Type of Job Move Utilized responses from the NLSY to determine whether the
job change was involuntary or voluntary.
1: Involuntary. Coded 1 if the respondent was fired, left due
to plant/firm closure, or his program ended
2: Voluntary. Coded 2 if the respondent reported to quit his
job
Worker Characteristics
Part-time status 0: Full-time; worked 30+ hours per week
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Variable Description







Firm Size 1: Small, 1 − 14 employees
2: Medium, 15 − 99 employees
3: Large, 100+ employees
Occupation The occupation indicators are grouped by categories according
to 1970 census codes reported in the NLSY.
1: Professional, Management, or Technical
2: Sales
3: Administrative or Clerical
4: Craftsmen
5: Operatives or Laborers
6: Farmers
7: Service
Changes in Firm Characteristics
Firm Size Changes 0: Did not change firm size
1: Moved to a larger firm
2: Moved to a smaller firm
Occupation Changes 0: Did not change occupation
1: Changed occupation
Changes in Geographic Location
Urban Residence Changes 0: Did not move to or from an urban/non-urban area
1: Moved from urban to non-urban area
2: Moved from non-urban to urban area
Regional Location Changes 0: Did not move regions
1: Moved regions
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Table A2: Full Sample Summary Statistics
Non-College College
White Black White Black
Nominal Wage 12.26 10.14 18.68 17.66
(5.598) (4.762) (9.026) (8.520)
Log Hourly Wage 2.411 2.230 2.816 2.769
(0.443) (0.409) (0.485) (0.466)
Potential Experience 7.647 8.247 6.730 7.383
(3.974) (3.950) (3.938) (4.031)
Tenure 3.205 2.556 3.678 3.743
(3.302) (2.861) (3.494) (3.544)
AFQT Score 0.264 -0.824 1.110 0.365
(0.786) (0.767) (0.457) (0.748)
Total Jobs 4.912 6.248 4.132 4.632
(2.904) (3.445) (2.492) (2.431)
Mobility Variables (%)
Stayed at Job 57.2 50.0 65.4 63.6
Moved Jobs 42.8 50.0 34.6 36.4
Voluntary (% of Movers) 71.1 63.2 80.0 83.9
Involuntary (% of Movers) 28.9 36.8 20.0 16.1
Worker Characteristics (%)
Part-Time Worker 4.49 4.83 2.50 3.03
Full-Time Worker 95.51 95.17 97.5 96.97
Small Firm 35.8 27.6 23.9 15.7
Medium Firm 32.2 34.5 29.6 33.1
Large Firm 32.0 37.9 46.5 51.2
Occupations (%)
Professional/Management/Technical 7.68 4.12 55.0 54.3
Sales 3.35 1.71 15.3 8.71
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Admin/Clerical 8.27 8.50 11.2 12.9
Craftsmen 25.7 16.5 4.36 3.84
Operatives/Laborers 42.6 46.7 7.20 9.86
Farmers 1.41 0.718 0.882 0.128
Service 10.9 21.7 6.07 10.2
Geography (%)
Urban 70.5 81.8 84.6 94.4
Non-Urban 29.5 18.2 15.4 5.58
Northeast 20.2 14.9 25.0 12.8
North Central 36.4 14.5 31.0 19.9
South 28.0 64.1 29.5 53.2
West 15.5 6.48 14.5 14.1
Firm/Worker Changes (%)
Did not change firm size 79.4 72.6 80.9 74.0
Moved to a smaller firm 10.1 13.8 09.33 13.3
Moved to a larger firm 10.6 13.6 9.82 12.6
Changed Occupations 17.8 22.6 10.3 12.0
Geographic Changes (%)
Did not change urban location 94.9 97.0 94.1 97.0
Moved to urban from non-urban 2.45 1.57 2.68 0.947
Moved to non-urban from urban 2.62 1.41 3.22 2.03
Did not change regions 97.55 97.7 95.9 96.6
Moved regions 2.54 2.29 4.10 3.44
Individuals 1280 597 532 106
Observations 9127 4198 3764 757
42
B Results Appendix
Figure B.1: Log Wage Gap Over Potential Experience by Education
Notes: Graphs present the non-linear returns to potential experience of White workers relative to Black
workers for high school- and college-educated workers with a quadratic fitted line. All estimates include year
fixed effects. Shaded areas display 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure B.2: Average Job Changes Over Potential Experience by Education
Notes: Graphs present the average number of job changes over potential experience of White workers and
Black workers. The decline in average job moves in the b) College are due to sample attrition.
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Table B1: Effect of Race and Job Mobility on Log Wages, College Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black -0.0243 -0.0293 0.0575 0.0750 0.0346 0.0369
(0.0543) (0.0535) (0.0558) (0.0562) (0.0704) (0.0704)
Potential Experience 0.1174∗∗∗ 0.1221∗∗∗ 0.1313∗∗∗ 0.1216∗∗∗ 0.0969∗∗∗ 0.0960∗∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0250) (0.0250)
Black × Potential Experience -0.0074 -0.0038 -0.0044 -0.0075 -0.0012 -0.0008
(0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0070) (0.0070)
AFQT Score 0.1171∗∗∗ 0.1130∗∗∗ 0.1165∗∗∗ 0.1192∗∗∗
(0.0276) (0.0362) (0.0368) (0.0372)




Black × Move 0.0489 0.0504
(0.0684) (0.0685)
Move × Potential Experience -0.0050 -0.0007
(0.0060) (0.0076)
Black × Move × Potential Experience -0.0046 -0.0081
(0.0092) (0.0102)
Move × AFQT Score × Potential Experience -0.0041
(0.0048)
Additional Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4588 4313 4313 4313 4312 4312
R2 0.1369 0.2616 0.2767 0.2707 0.3111 0.3114
Notes: The results are presented for workers with a college degree. All specifications include constants and
dummy controls for year fixed effects and potential experience squared. Columns (2) to (6) include additional
controls for region, urban, occupation, part-time status, firm size, and interactions of these dummies with
potential experience. Huber-White standard errors shown in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
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Table B2: Effect of Race and Job Mobility on Log Wages, Pooled Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black -0.0364 -0.0413∗ 0.0434∗ 0.0187 -0.0242 -0.0193
(0.0228) (0.0223) (0.0241) (0.0252) (0.0356) (0.0358)
Potential Experience 0.1077∗∗∗ 0.1096∗∗∗ 0.1147∗∗∗ 0.0968∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.0776∗∗∗
(0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0090) (0.0108) (0.0108)
Black*Potential Experience -0.0175∗∗∗ -0.0134∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ -0.0020 -0.0012
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0034)
College 0.4749∗∗∗ 0.3755∗∗∗ 0.3108∗∗∗ 0.3121∗∗∗ 0.2813∗∗∗ 0.2798∗∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0227) (0.0235) (0.0237) (0.0230) (0.0230)
AFQT Score 0.0913∗∗∗ 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0596∗∗∗ 0.0643∗∗∗
(0.0098) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0139)






Move*Potential Experience 0.0034 0.0043∗
(0.0025) (0.0025)
Black*Move*Potential Experience -0.0073∗∗ -0.0114∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0038)
Move*AFQT Score*Potential Experience -0.0039∗∗∗
(0.0013)
Additional Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17638 17638 17638 17638 17638 17638
R2 0.2492 0.3505 0.3683 0.3668 0.4060 0.4066
Notes: The results are presented for all workers. All specifications include constants and dummy controls for
year fixed effects and potential experience squared. Columns (2) to (6) include additional controls for region,
urban, occupation, part-time status,firm size, and interactions of these dummies with potential experience.
Huber-White standard errors shown in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table B3: Effect of Race and Job Mobility Wages, Controlling Tenure (t−1) and Involuntary
(1) (2) (3)
Black -0.0388 -0.0326 -0.0384
(0.0437) (0.0452) (0.0437)
Potential Experience 0.1013∗∗∗ 0.1067∗∗∗ 0.1018∗∗∗
(0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185)
Black × Potential Experience -0.0032 -0.0023 -0.0032
(0.0049) (0.0042) (0.0049)
Move -0.0745∗∗ -0.0840∗∗∗ -0.0648∗∗
(0.0293) (0.0301) (0.0297)
Black × Move 0.0480 0.0192 0.0371
(0.0502) (0.0533) (0.0521)
Move × Potential Experience -0.0003 -0.0056 -0.0002
(0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0041)
Black × Move × Potential Experience -0.0048 -0.0075 -0.0049
(0.0069) (0.0065) (0.0069)
AFQT 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0585∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗∗
(0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0212)
AFQT × Potential Experience 0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Move × AFQT × Potential Experience -0.0049∗∗∗ -0.0049∗∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Tenure (t− 1) 0.0565∗∗∗ 0.0564∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0073)
Black × Tenure (t− 1) 0.0087 0.0087
(0.0059) (0.0059)
Move × Tenure (t− 1) -0.0109∗ -0.0114∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0058)
Black × Move × Tenure (t− 1) -0.0229∗∗ -0.0224∗∗
(0.0096) (0.0097)
Involuntary Move -0.0381∗ -0.0341
(0.0216) (0.0217)
Black × Involuntary Move 0.0434 0.0375
(0.0349) (0.0350)
Observations 9963 9963 9963
R2 0.3090 0.2895 0.3093
Notes: All specifications include constants and dummy controls for year fixed effects, potential experience
squared, previous tenure squared, and dummies for region, urban, occupation, part-time status, class, firm
size, and interactions of these dummies with potential experience. Huber-White standard errors shown in
parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Potential Experience 0.1036∗∗∗ 0.1029∗∗∗
(0.0308) (0.0308)




Black × Move 0.0275 0.0210
(0.0964) (0.0948)
Move × Potential Experience -0.0027 -0.0013
(0.0087) (0.0089)




AFQT × Potential Experience 0.0004 0.0006
(0.0042) (0.0042)
Move × AFQT × Potential Experience -0.0026 -0.0023
(0.0047) (0.0046)
Tenure (t− 1) 0.0442∗∗∗ 0.0458∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0129)
Move × Tenure (t− 1) -0.0086 -0.0148
(0.0084) (0.0102)
Black × Tenure (t− 1) -0.0059
(0.0098)




Notes: The results are presented for workers with a college degree. All specifications include constants and
dummy controls for year fixed effects, potential experience squared, previous tenure squared, and dummies for
region, urban, occupation, part-time status, class, firm size, and interactions of these dummies with potential
experience. Huber-White standard errors shown in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Potential Experience 0.0994∗∗∗ 0.1000∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0145)




Black × Move 0.0215 0.0277
(0.0406) (0.0403)
Move*Potential Experience 0.0011 0.0003
(0.0029) (0.0030)




AFQT × Potential Experience 0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Move × AFQT × Potential Experience -0.0042∗∗∗ -0.0041∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013)
Tenure (t− 1) 0.0509∗∗∗ 0.0491∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0067)
Move × Tenure (t− 1) -0.0129∗∗∗ -0.0102∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0045)
Black × Tenure (t− 1) 0.0071
(0.0050)






Notes: The results are presented for all workers. All specifications include constants and dummy controls
for year fixed effects, potential experience squared, previous tenure squared, and dummies for region, urban,
occupation, part-time status, class, firm size, and interactions of these dummies with potential experience.
Huber-White standard errors shown in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
49
Table B6: Effect of Race and Job Mobility on Log Wages with Job Shopping Motives
(1) (2) (3)
Black 0.0147 -0.0127 0.0101
(0.0444) (0.0475) (0.0447)
Potential Experience 0.0036 0.0035 0.0035
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Black × Potential Experience -0.0084∗ -0.0084∗ -0.0083∗
(0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0049)
Moved to a smaller firm -0.0671∗∗∗ -0.0647∗∗ -0.0661∗∗∗
(0.0249) (0.0280) (0.0249)
Moved to a larger firm -0.0294 -0.0370 -0.0290
(0.0239) (0.0279) (0.0240)
Changed Occupations -0.0905∗∗∗ -0.1073∗∗∗ -0.0913∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0171) (0.0135)
Moved to urban -0.0944∗ -0.0960∗ -0.1195∗∗
(0.0552) (0.0552) (0.0595)
Moved to non-urban -0.0649 -0.0649 -0.0552
(0.0456) (0.0456) (0.0498)
Moved regions -0.0497 -0.0507 -0.0595
(0.0790) (0.0791) (0.0821)
Black × Moved to a smaller firm -0.0048
(0.0327)
Black × Moved to a larger firm 0.0178
(0.0297)
Black × Changed Occupations 0.0456∗
(0.0272)
Black × Moved to urban 0.0997
(0.0666)
Black × Moved to non-urban -0.0419
(0.0689)
Black × Moved regions 0.0321
(0.0541)
Observations 11398 11398 11398
R2 0.3095 0.3098 0.3097
Notes: The results are presented for workers with a high school degree. The regressions include identical
controls used in Table 2. Only results for job-movers are presented in the table. Huber-White standard
errors shown in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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